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We show that trades by corporate insiders after an earnings announcement determine in part 
the extent of the post-earnings announcement drift anomaly. Contrarian trades mitigate the 
under-reaction to earnings announcements, and confirmatory trades allow for price discovery 
with price movements continuing in the same direction of the earnings surprise. These results 
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transitory or permanent changes to the earnings process allowing the market to make 
appropriate inferences about the nature of the earnings surprise.  
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1 Introduction 
This paper examines the consequences of trading by corporate insiders on the well-documented 
post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) anomaly, whereby large positive unexpected 
earnings (UE) announcements are followed by an upwards drift in security returns, and large 
negative UE are followed by a downwards drift. The PEAD represents an under-reaction to 
earnings surprises, predominantly in those stocks with the largest surprises, for both positive 
(good news) and negative (bad news) announcements. Using a sample of 7,980 annual earnings 
announcements in the U.K. over the period 1995-2013, we first report evidence of the PEAD 
phenomenon: the spread in returns between the top and bottom quintiles formed on the basis 
of UE is a significant 3.4% six months after the earnings announcement. We go on to argue 
that corporate insider trading in the period after the earnings announcement affects the market’s 
learning process of whether a structural change in the earnings series has occurred by providing 
additional information to the market about the interpretation of the earnings surprise. We show 
that information in contrarian directors’ trades after an earnings announcement - director sales 
after good news or director buys after bad news - mitigate the PEAD. The market observes the 
trading behaviour of directors and infers that the earnings surprise reflects only a transitory 
change in earnings. Conditioning on these contrarian directors’ trades, we find that the top to 
bottom quintile spread is reduced to an insignificant -1.4% six months later.  In contrast, those 
companies with confirmatory director trades (in the same direction as the earnings surprise: 
director sales after bad news or director buys after good news) are deemed by the market to 
signal that there has been a permanent shift in earnings but the magnitude is difficult to 
determine. The post-earnings quintile spread in these companies that display confirmatory 
directors’ trades increases to a highly significant 7.3%. This exacerbated PEAD represents 
price discovery as the market learns about the values of the new parameters in the earnings 
process. In the absence of any directors’ trades, the market remains uncertain about the 
structural break. Our evidence on the market response to the joint signals of an earnings surprise 
and subsequent directors’ trades suggests that the PEAD represents a learning response to the 
identification of permanent and transitory changes in the earnings process. 
Seeking to explain the PEAD anomaly, Bernard and Thomas (1990) attribute it to the 
failure of stock prices to fully reflect the implications of time series properties of earnings for 
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future earnings.1  Taking further the hypothesis that PEAD is caused by investors’ inefficient 
use of information to predict future earnings, subsequent research ascribe the anomaly to: 
unsophisticated investors’ trades (Bartov, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000), the 
underestimation of the implications of inflation (Chordia and Shivakumar, 2005), accounting 
conservatism (Narayanamoorthy, 2006) as well as poor disclosure readability (Lee, 2012). 
Recent research by Milian (2015) documents that the PEAD anomaly persists, albeit 
concentrated over a shorter period of time. A possible explanation for the pervasiveness of 
PEAD may arise from cognitive biases preventing investors from fully reacting to the new 
information in the earnings surprise, including limited attention (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 
2009), investors’ overconfidence in their private beliefs (Liang, 2003) and limits to arbitrage 
(Ng, Rusticus and Verdi, 2008). Alternatively, what appears to be a delayed reaction to the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings could be an implication of investors’ 
learning or ‘‘rational structural uncertainty’’ (e.g. Francis, Lafond, Olsson and Schipper, 2007). 
Learning models predict that investors under-react to information signals after a structural shift 
has occurred, because there is uncertainty as to whether a structural shift has in fact happened. 
Brav and Heaton (2002) note significant similarities in the underpinnings of behavioural and 
rational learning theories, and caution that it may be difficult to distinguish between them. 
In a similar vein, we argue that trading by corporate insiders provides information that 
investors use to address the inference problem as to whether a structural shift in the earnings 
process has occurred. Investors who observe the direction of corporate insider trading are able 
to infer directors’ private information about the earnings surprise. We follow Seyhun (1998) 
and identify a set of contrarian insider trades, taking place after the earnings announcement but 
in the opposite direction to the sign of the earnings surprise. These trades provide a signal to 
the market that the earnings surprise denotes a transitory realization, and the market’s response 
reverses the initial reaction to the earnings announcements. The remaining set of insider trades 
occur in the same direction as the earnings surprise which we classify as confirmatory trades. 
These trades signal that informed insiders believe that the earnings surprise represents 
information about a permanent change in the earnings process. The market updates its beliefs 
about the permanent-transitory nature of earnings on the basis of this additional information 
and in the case of confirmatory directors’ trades, the initial under-reaction to the earnings 
                                                 
1 A comprehensive literature review of the PEAD can be found in Richardson, Tuna and Wysocki (2010) and 
Kothari (2001). The PEAD is illustrated in Figure 1 by the upward drift in returns represented by the unconditional 
good news PEAD box following a positive earnings surprise. The downward drift in returns following a negative 
earnings surprise is illustrated by the position of the unconditional bad news PEAD box. 
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surprise adjusts as prices continue to move in the same direction as the surprise, representing 
price discovery.2  
Francis et al. (2007) predict that the under-reaction to earnings announcements is 
negatively associated with the level of the precision of the earnings signal, because investors’ 
learning is delayed when the earnings signal is less precise. We extend this argument and 
examine the effect of interacting the precision of the earnings signals with corporate insider 
trading. We demonstrate that in the presence of contrarian insider trading after the earnings 
announcement, there is no under-reaction to earnings announcements in firms with low 
earnings precision. The implication is that in these hard-to-value cases, contrarian directors’ 
trades allows the market to interpret the earnings surprise as a temporary event.  In contrast, 
we find that in the presence of confirmatory trading the under-reaction is still significant. This 
suggests that confirmatory trades initiate a learning process to establish the extent of the 
permanent shift in the earning process even under circumstances where this is not likely to 
occur, i.e., under high earnings precision.  
Our research contributes to the literature examining the implications of insider trading 
disclosure for the valuation of corporate earnings. To date, this research has indicated that the 
information contained in directors’ trading allows the market to develop inferences about future 
earnings. For instance, Udpa (1996) shows that insider trading prior to an earnings 
announcement mitigates the market reaction to the subsequent earnings announcement. In a 
similar vein, Roulstone (2008) reports that insider purchases and sales result in lower market 
reaction during the earnings announcement. Beneish and Vargus (2002) find that the 
discretionary component of accruals in earnings is more persistent when accompanied by 
directors’ purchases and less persistent when accompanied by sales. More recently, Choi, 
Faurel and Hillegeist (2017) show that the market uses pre-announcement insider trading 
information to anticipate and interpret the current earnings news leading to improved stock 
price efficiency during the post-earnings announcement period. In contrast to this stream of 
research, we are interested to find out how the market employs the information in directors’ 
trading that occurs after the earnings announcement.  
Kolasinski and Li (2010) examine insider trading after the earnings announcement. 
However, they focus on whether insiders exploit the initial under-reaction to an earnings 
                                                 
2 Veenman (2012) also distinguishes between insider confirmatory buys after good news, and contrarian buys 
after bad news. 
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announcement. Our study is mostly related to Veenman (2012) who investigates the short-term 
market reaction to the post-earnings announcement disclosure of insider purchases. Veenman 
(2012) finds that insiders’ purchases enable the market to resolve the uncertainty associated 
with the valuation of past reported earnings. We differ from Veenman (2012) by investigating 
the implications of insider trading for the post-earnings announcement drift. This allows us to 
demonstrate that insider trading does not simply trigger a short-term market reaction but 
instead, initiates a learning process of uncertainty resolution with respect to whether a structural 
change in the earnings series has occurred.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the 
regulation and practices with respect to insider trading around earning announcements in the 
UK. In Section 3 we develop our hypotheses concerning the impact of insider trading on the 
post-earnings announcement drift. In Section 4, we discuss the methodology that we employ 
to test our hypotheses, and in Section 5, we describe the data and the construction of our 
variables. In section 6 we report our findings, and finally in Section 7, we present the 
conclusions to the study.  
2 Insider trading around earnings announcements: Regulation and practices in 
the UK 
The regulatory framework and common practices in the UK allow us to determine the timing 
of transactions which are most likely to convey insiders’ private information about the 
interpretation of the earnings surprise. The UK provides a unique setting for our investigation 
since the institutional arrangements allow first, directors to trade immediately after the earnings 
announcement and associated trading ban, and second, a speedy disclosure of transactions.  
Insider trading on price sensitive information and in particular the trades by directors in 
the UK are regulated by The Companies Act 1985, The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1993, The 
Financial Services and Markets Act (FSMA) 2000, Listing Rules and Disclosure Rules 
administered by the Financial Conduct Authority, who may impose penalties such as fines or 
imprisonment to insiders found guilty of trading on inside information. The London Stock 
Exchange Model Code (1977) (part of the Listing Rules), requires directors who trade in their 
own company’s shares first, to seek clearance to trade from the Board ahead of the transaction 
and second, to report their trades to the company no later than the fourth day after the 
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transaction occurred. 3  In turn, the company must notify the Stock Exchange no later than the 
following day, when the information about the trade is disseminated to the market. Although 
the duration of this process appears to be lengthy, in practice, the disclosure of insider trades 
in the UK is very timely. Fidrmuc, Goergen and Renneboog (2006) report that 85% of the 
directors’ trades in the UK are announced to the market either on the same day they occur or 
on the following day. This is confirmed in our data, with 82.11% of the shares traded within 
the first 10 trading days after and including the earnings announcement day, being disclosed 
on the same or following day. 
In addition, the Model Code prescribes a clearly-defined and well observed trading ban,4 
forbidding insiders from trading for two months prior to the earnings announcement. The 
purpose of this trading ban is to prevent insiders from exploiting any private information with 
respect to the forthcoming earnings announcement.   However, an insider may trade after the 
end of the trading ban, with the trading restriction ending immediately after the earnings 
announcement has been made public. Our analysis will focus on these directors’ transactions 
taking place shortly after the earning announcement.  
3 Hypothesis development 
In this section we develop our hypotheses concerning the impact of corporate insider trading 
on the post-earnings announcement drift – the market’s under-reaction to earnings 
announcements. We argue that trading by corporate insiders allows the market to make 
improved inferences about changes in the underlying earning process and that such revisions 
can partly explain the PEAD. Bulkley and Tonks (1989), Timmermann (1996),  and Veronesi 
(1999) have shown that since standard valuation models rely on estimates of the growth process 
for dividends and earnings as inputs, small revisions to these growth estimates can generate 
large changes in equity values which can explain the observed excess volatility of stock prices. 
Investors form expectations of future fundamentals such as earnings or dividends based in part 
on the time series properties of previous fundamentals. They update their beliefs about these 
estimates as new data on dividends and earnings become available. When a large surprise in 
                                                 
3 Insiders in the UK are normally interpreted to be executive and non-executive directors of the company. Thus, 
we use the terms “insiders” and “directors” interchangeably to refer to corporate insiders.  
4 These listing rules apply to firms on the Main Market and on AIM. The trading ban in the UK has been shown 
to be well observed (e.g. Korczak, Korczak and Lasfer, 2010) with directors either abstaining from trading during 
this period, or trading with the permission of the company chairperson. 
7 
 
earnings is announced, whether positive or negative, investors must decide whether this change 
represents a transitory or permanent variation in earnings. If the nature of the change in earnings 
is transitory, then the value of the company will only change by the contemporaneous change 
in the most recent earnings level. For instance, Freeman and Tse (1992) show that transitory 
earnings have small or no impact on prices. On the other hand, if a structural change has 
occurred in the earnings process, then the announced earnings represent the first realisation 
from a new earnings process, and the value of the firm should change to reflect the new earnings 
process. From the perspective of a learning model, investors face an identification problem 
from the most recent earnings figure, as to whether the unexpected value is an outlier from the 
previous earnings process, or is the first observation in a new earnings series. As well as 
explaining excess volatility puzzles, learning models in finance have been applied to explain 
asymmetric time-varying volatilities (David, 1997), the equity risk premium (Brennan and Xia, 
2001), the value premium (Pástor and Veronesi, 2003), and term structure puzzles (Bulkley 
and Giordani, 2011).  Lewellen and Shanken (2002) develop an equilibrium rational learning 
model where Bayesian-investors under-react to information signals after a structural shift has 
occurred, because there may be some uncertainty as to whether a structural shift has in fact 
happened. If there has been a structural shift, then investors face the difficult problem of 
valuing a new income stream with new parameters. Lewellen and Shanken (2002) suggest that 
many stock market anomalies can be explained by rational learning about parameter 
uncertainty but argue that this does not mean that there are exploitable arbitrage opportunities 
because “the strategy earns abnormal profits in a frequentist sense, but not from the Bayesian 
perspective of investors" (p. 1125). Brav and Heaton (2002) also note that it may be difficult 
to distinguish between rational learning and behavioural explanations for stock market 
anomalies.5 
In an environment with parameter uncertainty investors will look around for further 
information that will allow them to make a better inference on the transitory or permanent 
shock to earnings. One such source of information is the trading behaviour of corporate 
insiders, who are allowed to trade after the earnings announcement in the UK following the 
relaxation of the two-month prior trading ban. Insider trading is a mechanism that enables 
private information held by corporate insiders to be incorporated into stock market prices 
                                                 
5 These learning models do not distinguish between learning and imitating. Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel and 
Ozdaglar (2011) incorporate social networks into a sequential learning model, and demonstrate even when there 
are an influential group of agents whom other agents copy, there will still be an asymptotic convergence to the 
efficient outcome (no herding) provided that the information signals received by individuals are unbounded. 
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(Manne, 1966). We argue that after an earnings announcement, large earnings surprises may 
reflect either an extreme value from existing distribution, representing a transitory component 
to earnings, or a value from new distribution, representing a structural change in the earnings 
process. Investors must assess whether a structural change has occurred.6 Bayesian investors 
update beliefs from sample information generated by the relevant distribution, and directors’ 
trades after the earnings announcement represent that sample information. We assume that 
directors with private information about the fundamental value of their firm, trade to maximise 
their wealth.7 They will buy (sell) shares when the market price undervalues (overvalues) their 
estimate of the firm’s fundamental value. This behaviour is consistent with the empirical 
evidence which demonstrates that information in directors’ trading is associated with 
significant market reactions in both the short run (Fidrmuc et al., 2006) and long run 
(Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Further, work by Seyhun (1998),  and Hillier and Marshall (2002) 
has established trading patterns around the earnings announcement that illustrate insiders’ 
informational advantages. Contrarian directors’ trades in the post-earnings announcement 
period imply that corporate insiders know the earnings surprise is a transitory event, and that 
current prices are driven by an over-reaction to the earnings surprise. The market infers that 
the earnings surprise reflects a transitory change in earnings, and there will be no PEAD. On 
the other hand, confirmatory directors’ trades, in the post-announcement period reveal that 
insiders know the earnings surprise represents a permanent structural change. The market will 
correctly infer that there has been a permanent change in the earnings process, although the 
parameters of this new distribution will need to be estimated. 
Seyhun (1998) notes that an insider who wants to purchase shares and anticipates a 
negative earnings surprise will hold back from trading until after the bad news has been 
announced in order to buy shares at a lower price. Conversely, an insider who wishes to sell 
and anticipates a positive earnings surprise will again postpone trading until after the public 
announcement, in order to sell at a higher price. These contrarian trading patterns are motivated 
by insiders’ information that the earnings surprise represents a transitory event. Specifically, 
                                                 
6 In Appendix 1 we provide a simple example of a shock to an earnings process generated by a uniform 
distribution, which reveals a structural change with an unknown upper support. Conjugate prior beliefs on this 
unknown parameter are represented by a Pareto distribution, meaning that investors who update from the 
likelihood function according to Bayesian rules will have posterior beliefs that are also Pareto. We show that such 
a learning mechanism generates a price process that replicates a PEAD. 
7 Bagnoli and Watts (2007) model managers’ disclosure strategy around earnings announcements, and show that 
the optimal strategies are asymmetric around good and bad news, reflecting transitory and permanent components. 
However, an underlying assumption in Bagnoli and Watts (2007) is that the manager selects a voluntary disclosure 
strategy to maximize the market price of the firm. In our setting, we assume that managers trade to exploit their 
information advantage for their own benefit. 
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Seyhun (1998) argues that “Following their sales, insiders do not necessarily expect negative 
future performance. They only know that past expectation of good performance is completed 
and the stock price fully reflects insiders’ expectations.” (p 51). Following Seyhun (1998), we 
argue that the contrarian direction of these insider trades reveals that prices have over-reacted 
to the information in the earnings surprise, with the implication that such earnings surprises 
represent only a transitory change in earnings. The contrarian nature of these trades provides a 
contradictory signal to the earnings surprise, and causes market participants to revise their 
expectations in the opposite direction to the sign of the earnings surprise. The joint signal of an 
earnings surprise and a contrarian directors’ trade, allows investors to infer that the earnings 
surprise does not reflect a permanent change in earnings, and we would not expect any further 
price movement in the direction of the earnings surprise; in fact, PEAD will be dissipated. 
Following these discussions, we set out our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Informed contrarian directors’ trading after an earnings 
announcement conveys a signal on the transitory nature of the earnings surprise that 
attenuates the PEAD.  
Figure 1 illustrates the pattern in returns that we predict following either of two joint 
signals: (positive earnings surprise and directors’ sells) or (negative earnings surprise and 
directors’ buys). In both cases we expect the initial stock price reaction to the earnings surprise 
to represent an over-reaction which is then mitigated by the contrarian trades, represented by 
the attenuated PEAD boxes.  
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
We now turn to the other type of insider trading around the earnings announcement: 
confirmatory insider trades. Confirmatory insider trades are those directors’ trades that occur 
after the earnings announcement and in the same direction as the sign of the earning surprise, 
and are also illustrated in Figure 1. From these trades investors infer that there has been a 
permanent shift in the earnings process, since with confirmatory trades informed insiders are 
either buying shares after the good earnings news, or selling shares after the announcement of 
a bad earnings surprise.   In both cases confirmatory directors’ trading reveals a mis-valuation 
of the underlying firm fundamentals, and that the initial price reaction was an under-reaction 
to the earnings surprise. The direction of these confirmatory trades indicate that prices have 
still to fully reflect the information in the earnings surprise. This behaviour is consistent with 
the latest earnings surprise figure representing a permanent change to the earnings process. 
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However, there are two issues in relation to the inferences that the market makes from 
confirmatory directors’ trades.  
First, the absolute upper limit on the permanent change in earnings is undefined whether 
for good news or bad news. Although the market may infer from these trades that there has 
been a permanent change in earnings, the parameters of this new earnings process are not yet 
known, and there is still much uncertainty about the ultimate equilibrium share price.8 Although 
the joint signal of confirmatory trades and the earnings surprise indicates that a structural break 
has occurred, it is well-known that analysts typically under-estimate the extent of earning 
changes (e.g. Abarbanell and Bernard, 1992). Further, Ali, Klein and Rosenfeld (1992) show 
this under-estimation is more severe when earnings are deemed permanent. It is therefore 
unlikely that with a joint signal of an earnings surprise and a confirmatory insider trade prices 
will immediately jump to a new equilibrium level. It is more likely that there will be subsequent 
drift to the new equilibrium given that even professional investors (e.g. analysts) under-
estimate the permanence of the structural change. 
Second, insiders have reduced incentives to engage in confirmatory trading after the 
earnings announcement, given that the earnings surprise reveals in part the insiders’ 
information. Directors would have greater incentives to trade prior to the earnings 
announcement to fully exploit their private information about the forthcoming earnings 
surprise. In the context of the UK’s two month trading ban, an insider would purchase (sell) 
shares before the announcement of a positive (negative) earnings surprise, just prior to the 
imposition of the trading ban.  However, pre-earnings announcement insider trading is rare as 
it exposes insiders to both litigation and reputation costs. Hillier and Marshall (2002) report 
that although insiders with private information about the upcoming earnings announcement 
may trade prior to the start of the trading ban period, the transparency of the trading disclosures 
and the legal consequences means that such trades are uncommon. Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2007) show that insiders refrain from pre-earnings announcement trades when the magnitude 
of the surprise is extreme. Also, there is evidence of a substantially higher incidence of 
directors’ trading in the period following the earnings announcement, and this is consistent 
                                                 
8 A similar issue arises in the case of insider trading around earnings restatements.  Badertscher, Hribar and Jenkins 
(2011) argue that it is only possible to identify directional hypotheses about how stock prices respond to insider 
trading and accounting restatements, but not the rank order of the magnitude of the effects. 
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with insiders’ reluctance to trade before the announcement and preference to delay their trades 
(Hillier and Marshall, 2002).  
In summary, although the patterns associated with confirmatory insider trading are 
consistent with insiders exploiting their informational advantage over the interpretation of the 
earnings surprise, we anticipate the asymmetric incentives (compared with contrarian trades) 
may render a delayed stock market response to the earnings surprise. This discussion leads us 
to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Informed confirmatory directors’ trading after an earnings 
announcement conveys a noisy signal that a structural change in the earnings distribution 
has occurred, resulting in an exacerbated PEAD. 
Figure 1 illustrates the predicted pattern in returns following confirmatory directors’ 
trades. For both good and bad earnings surprises, the initial stock price reaction under-estimates 
the long-run fundamental price, and the subsequent stock price reaction is represented by the 
exacerbated PEAD boxes. The underlying conjecture in the development of hypotheses H1 and 
H2 is that the disclosure of informed directors’ trading provides relevant information to the 
market which accelerates investors’ learning with regards to the transitory-permanent nature 
of the earnings surprise and thus, either attenuates or exacerbates the reaction to the earnings 
announcement. We may seek further support for these arguments by examining these 
conjectures in relation to the characteristics in the earnings surprise related to the difficulty 
investors have in interpreting these signals. Francis et al. (2007) argues that a testable 
consequence of a rational learning model explanation of the PEAD is that we would expect the 
PEAD anomaly to be most prevalent in high information uncertainty firms whereby uncertainty 
is captured by the precision of earnings. They show that in these hard-to-value firms the under-
reaction to earning announcements is exacerbated by the low precision in earnings signals since 
the investors’ inference problem becomes more complex for these cases, and the speed at which 
investors incorporate the information in the earnings surprise is delayed. Veenman (2012) and 
Bhattacharya, Desai and Venkataraman (2013) extend these arguments and show that a low 
precision earnings signal amplifies the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, 
and increases the importance of insiders’ private information for investors’ assessments.  
Hypothesis 3 then seeks to expand the evidence of the impact of contrarian and 
confirmatory trades conditional upon the influence of earnings precision:   
Hypothesis 3:  
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(H3a): Contrarian insider trading attenuates the PEAD for low earnings precision (high 
information uncertainty) firm-announcements. 
(H3b): Confirmatory insider trading exacerbates the PEAD for high earnings precision 
(low information uncertainty) firm-announcements. 
The two parts to H3 seek to corroborate the learning mechanism underlying the impact 
of contrarian and confirmatory insider trading outlined in H1 and H2. In the case of contrarian 
trades, evidence of a mitigated PEAD under circumstances when it is most likely to occur, 
validates the suggested mechanism through which learning occurs. H3a predicts that in low 
precision firms, contrarian directors’ trades will be effective at weakening the PEAD. We might 
anticipate a corollary of H2 with respect to confirmatory trades in high precision firms. We 
expect that in high earnings precision firms the PEAD will not be present, in which case if we 
find evidence of a PEAD following confirmatory directors’ trades in such firms, this again will 
validate directors’ trades as a learning mechanism. H3b predicts that in high precision firms, 
the presence of confirmatory insider trading will lead to a PEAD effect.  
To summarise, our main hypotheses H1 and H2 are concerned with the role of informed 
contrarian and confirmatory insider trading in explaining the PEAD.  Hypothesis H3 
complements the first two hypotheses, since it aims to corroborate the role of insider trading in 
the context of low and high earnings precision firms, and thus validate that this learning 
mechanism is distinct from the learning that relies on fundamentals. 
4 Research design  
To investigate the effect of informed insider trading on the under-reaction to earnings 
announcements, we follow the event-study methodology to first identify the post-earnings 
announcement drift (e.g. Bartov et al., 2000)  and then include variables that examine the 
impact of contrarian and confirmatory directors’ trading on stock market returns. The timing 
of these events ensures that causality flows from the joint signal of the earnings surprise and 
directors’ trades through to abnormal returns. Evidence of the under-reaction to earnings 
announcements is documented by a significant association between the earnings surprise and 
subsequent returns, as follows:  
 
BHARi,t = α0 + α1RUEi,t  + α2Controlsi,t  + εi,t       (1) 
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where, BHARi,t denotes market adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns using the FTSE 
all share marked index measured from 11 days after the earnings announcement to six months 
later (day +126), where a month is defined in terms of 21 trading days, and RUEit is the rescaled 
quintile rank of the earnings surprise. Our main results refer to the PEAD over an approximate 
6-month trading horizon. We concentrate on this time period since Bernard and Thomas (1989) 
report “a disproportionately large fraction of post-announcement drift is concentrated in the 
few days preceding and including the next quarter’s earnings announcement” (p. 30). In the 
US where most firms report on a quarterly basis the timing of the PEAD is often measured over 
a 3-month horizon to capture the next earnings announcement date. In the UK where semi-
annual reporting is much more common, Liu, Strong and Xu (2003) report the existence of the 
PEAD over a range of time horizons, but concentrate their abnormal return tests on the 6-month 
horizon. In order to assess the robustness of our results to the timing effects, we undertake 
additional tests for PEAD returns measured at 2-month (+11 to +52), 3-month (+11 to +73), 4-
month (+11 to +94) and 5-month (+11 to +115) time horizons.  
We first calculate unexpected earnings defined as the quintile rank of the earnings 
surprise, where the cut-off points are determined by the distribution of the earnings surprise in 
the previous year. We define the earnings surprise based on the difference between actual 
earnings and the latest analysts’ earnings forecast (e.g. Ayers, Li and Yeung, 2011). We follow  
Mendenhall (2004) and define RUEi,t as a variable taking the value “-0.5” when an observation 
belongs to the bottom quintile rank of earnings surprise and “0.5” when an observation belongs 
to the top quintile rank of earnings surprise. For the intermediate quintiles, we set RUEi,t to be 
equal to zero. In this case, the difference between the extreme earnings surprise quintiles is 
equal to unity and therefore, α1 represents the spread in average abnormal returns between 
observations in the highest and lowest unexpected earnings surprise quintiles. Figure 1 shows 
how this spread is measured. In the case of a positive earnings surprise the unconditional PEAD 
is measured by the vertical distance represented by the GN_PEAD box. Similarly, an 
unconditional bad news PEAD is measured by the BN_PEAD box. The spread measures the 
difference between these two boxes: spread = [GN_PEAD – BN_PEAD].  
We control for the risk factors and variables that have been shown to be relevant for the 
UK stock market (e.g. Jiang, Soares and Stark, 2016). These include (i) size measured as the 
market value of the company at the fiscal year end, (ii) book-to-market which is the ratio of 
common shareholder’s equity to the market value of the company at the day of fiscal year end, 
(iii) momentum which is measured as the buy and hold market adjusted return over the six 
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months prior to the earnings announcement, (iv) the effect of R&D, captured by the ratio of 
R&D expense to the market value of the company, (v) leverage, measured as total debt divided 
by the market value of the company at the fiscal year end, (vi) the cash flow effect, captured 
by the ratio of operating cash flows to the firm’s total assets, (vii) the natural logarithm of the 
share price at the begging of the accumulation period, and (viii) capital expenditures divided 
by the market value at the fiscal year end. In each case we control for these risk factors by 
means of the quintile rank of the corresponding variables (e.g. Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers and 
Teoh, 2008). In Appendix 2 we provide details on how these variables have been estimated. 
Building on the evidence for the PEAD reported for the UK (e.g. Liu et al., 2003) and 
the US (e.g. Ayers et al., 2011), we predict a positive and statistically significant coefficient α1 
denoting an abnormal returns continuation along the sign of the earnings surprise RUEi,t.  In 
order to test Hypotheses H1 and H2, we adjust (1) by partitioning the association between the 
earnings surprise and subsequent returns in the presence of informed contrarian (Ctrar) and 
confirmatory (Cfirm) insider trading. Specifically, we modify (1) as follows: 
 
BHARi,t = β0+β1Ctrar_RUEi,t+ β2Cfirm_RUEi,t + β3NT_RUEi,t 
+ β4Ctrari,t + β5Cfirmi,t  + β6Controlsi,t +εi,t   (2) 
 
where, Ctrar_RUEi,t  equals to RUEi,t when directors engage in contrarian trading after 
the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise; Cfirm_RUEi,t equals to RUEi,t when directors 
engage in confirmatory trading after the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise; 
NT_RUEi,t equals to RUEi,t when directors abstain from trading after the earnings 
announcement, and zero otherwise. We also include the main effects of Ctrari,t and Cfirmi,t in 
order to control for the possible effect of contrarian and confirmatory trading on subsequent 
abnormal returns.  
Hypothesis H1 postulates that contrarian insider trading conveys useful information on 
the transitory nature of the earnings surprise that attenuates the under-reaction to earnings 
announcements. Hence, we expect the coefficient β1 to be insignificantly different from zero 
(β1 =0) indicating that the earnings surprise is not associated with a subsequent drift.  H2 
predicts that the presence of confirmatory insider trades will convey information about the 
permanent nature of the earnings surprise, which nevertheless, involves significant uncertainty 
and thus, there will be a continuation of the PEAD. Therefore, we expect the coefficient β2 to 
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be positive and significant (β2>0). Additionally, the absence of any insider trading implies that 
the additional information needed to allow the market to interpret the permanent-transitory 
nature of the earnings surprise is not available, and we might expect β3 to be positive in line 
with the overall evidence on PEAD. The case of PEAD in the absence of insider trading will 
be further investigated when testing H3. Furthermore, we seek to corroborate the distinct role 
of directors’ trading in promoting efficient stock prices as set out in H1 and H2 by comparing 
these coefficients, and we anticipate:  β2 >  β3 > β1. Referring back to Figure 1, the conditional 
good news PEAD after contrarian insider trading is given by the GNct_PEAD box, and the 
conditional bad news contrarian PEAD is given by the BNct_PEAD box. So, the contrarian 
spread is the difference between these two boxes: Contr. Spread = [GNct_PEAD – 
BNct_PEAD]. Similarly, for the confirmatory spread: Conf. Spread = [GNcf_PEAD – 
BNcf_PEAD]. 
In order to test Hypothesis H3, we need to obtain an estimate of the earnings signal 
precision. Following Francis et al. (2007) we measure the earnings signal precision by means 
of the magnitude of discretionary accruals.9 To construct our measure of earnings precision, 
we rank firms annually based on the magnitude of their discretionary accruals. We assign an 
earnings precision variable (PREC) which takes the value of 1 if a firm belongs to the bottom 
tercile of this ranking, and 0 otherwise. Observations ranked in the bottom tercile of the 
unsigned discretionary accruals’ distribution are considered to exhibit high earnings signal 
precision (PREC=1) while the remaining observations are considered to exhibit low levels of 
precision (PREC=0). 
Equation (3) then enables us to test H3 by examining the association between the 
earnings surprise and subsequent returns, as described in (2), conditioning on the earnings 
signal precision (PREC).  
 
BHARi,t = γ0 + γ 1Ctrar_RUEi,t + γ 2Cfirm_RUEi,t + γ 3NT_RUEi,t 
+ γ 4Ctrar_RUEi,t*PRECi,t + γ 5Cfirm_RUEi,t*PRECi,t + γ 6NT_RUEi,t*PRECi,t 
+ γ 7Ctrari,t + γ 8Cfirmi,t + γ 9PRECi,t + γ 10Controlsi,t + εi,t     (3) 
 
                                                 
9 The main tests in Francis et al. (2007) employ a model that relies on a long time series of data and is based on 
Dechow and Dichev (2002). However, they report similar results when using the proxy that we employ here (cf. 
page 427 of their paper).  
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The coefficients of particular interest in (3) are the coefficients γ1 and γ5. These coefficients 
represent respectively: the influence of contrarian insider trading in low earnings precision 
firms (PREC=0) where the PEAD is most prevalent; and the role of confirmatory insider 
trading in high earnings precision firms (PREC=1), where it has been shown that the PEAD is 
largely absent. Consistent with the distinctive ability of contrarian insider trading to facilitate 
investors’ learning under low earnings precision, H3a predicts that γ1 would be insignificantly 
different from zero. H3b predicts that even for high precision firms investors will be sensitive 
to the confirmatory directors’ trades, and therefore we anticipate γ5 > 0.  In the absence of 
insider trading, we anticipate a negative and significant coefficient γ6. This is because in the 
absence of insider trading, the information acquisition process is largely based on the 
underlying fundamentals as suggested by Francis et al. (2007). 
5 Data and empirical proxies 
5.1 Data 
We collect data for all UK non-financial companies listed in both the MAIN and the AIM 
markets for the period between 1995 and 2013. This yields an initial sample of 19,804 
observations. Requiring an intersection between Datastream and  I/B/E/S Detail History files 
to collect the necessary data for estimating the earnings surprise variable, we lose 9,366 data 
points mainly due to missing earnings announcements.10 We note that requiring this 
intersection between Datastream and I/B/E/S datasets introduces a selection bias against the 
inclusion of very small and illiquid companies without an analyst following. We define the 
earnings surprise as: 
UEi,t=(Actual_EPSi,t-Forecasted_EPSi,t)/Pi,t-1 
where, Actual_EPSi,t is the actual earnings per share reported in I/B/E/S for year t; 
Forecasted_EPSi,t is the single most recent forecast made by the timeliest analysts prior to the 
earnings announcement;11,  and Pi,t-1 is the stock price at the previous fiscal year end. We 
                                                 
10 We require the annual final earnings announcements to be available in Datastream or I\B\E\S, and ignore any 
interim announcements. After eliminating earnings announcements announced more than 200 days after the fiscal 
year end, we supplement the earnings announcements in Datastream from I\B\E\S and choose the earliest given 
the concerns of I\B\E\S reliability (Hung, Li and Wang, 2014). Most UK companies also report interim earnings 
announcements after six months, but a small number report quarterly interim earnings announcements. We 
undertake a robustness check of our results and exclude the 75 firms that make quarterly announcements. 
11 Following Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002), we only consider the latest forecast preceding the earnings 
announcement by at least three days. Using the latest forecast is quite common (e.g. Bartov et al., 2002; Ayers et 
al., 2011) and is known to be more closely related to the market reaction at the earnings announcement (Brown 
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convert UEi,t  into quintiles of earnings surprises based on the magnitude of the surprise. We 
acknowledge that not all companies announce earnings at the same time and the distribution of 
earnings surprises might not be known prior to the portfolio formation date. Therefore, we 
define the quintiles of the earnings surprises from the distribution of the preceding year’s 
surprises. We further eliminate 2,044 observations due to missing market data from 
Datastream, and a further 7 observations are eliminated due to missing accounting data that are 
necessary for the calculation of discretionary accruals.12 Trimming buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns as well as the variables involved in the estimation of the discretionary accruals at the 
2st and 98th percentiles of their distributions reduces further the sample by 334 firm-year 
observations. These selection criteria yield a final sample of 7,980 firm-year observations from 
1,373 different firms, of which 1,524 firm-year observations and 429 firms are AIM-listed. 
Table 1 summarises the sample selection procedure.  
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
5.2 Abnormal returns 
We measure the post earnings announcement returns as the buy-and-hold market adjusted 
returns beginning from the 11th day and ending six months later, relative to the earnings 
announcement. We calculate returns using daily prices and dividends from Datastream given 
the concerns in Ince and Porter (2006) with regard to returns estimated from the Return Index 
(RI) data-item. Following Lee (2011) we drop any day where more than 90% of the shares 
outstanding are not traded (i.e. have zero return on that day). Furthermore, in order to filter out 
suspicious stock returns, we follow Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) and set returns that are greater 
than 100% (-95%) equal to 100% (-95%). Finally, thin trading leading to missing returns may 
also compromise our statistical inferences, and therefore we calculate trade-to-trade returns 
(Maynes and Rumsey, 1993). Specifically, trade-to-trade returns are calculated from non-
missing price days. For a stock with a missing price, the corresponding portfolio return is added 
to the next non-missing price day’s portfolio return for a trade-to-trade abnormal return 
calculation.13 In addition, to reduce the influence of our thin trading adjustment on abnormal 
                                                 
and Kim, 1991). We further exclude forecasts preceding the earnings announcement by more than 200 days to 
prevent stale forecasts being included in the analysis.   
12 We eliminate firm year observations whose accounting reporting period is less than 340 and more than 380 
days (similarly to García Lara, García Osma and Mora, 2005).  
13 An alternative approach is to calculate lumped returns which consist of trade-to-trade returns on non-missing 
price days and zero on missing price days with no adjustment to the portfolio return when returns are missing, 
given that this procedure does not allow for missing returns. Using lumped returns, instead of trade to trade, does 
not alter our conclusions.  
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returns, we follow Hung et al. (2014) and require firms to be traded for at least 70% of the 
trading days within our measurement period.  
   
5.3 Insider trading  
Information on directors’ trading is from the Hemmington Scott Directors’ Trading Dataset. In 
line with prior research in the UK (e.g. Fidrmuc et al., 2006), we define insider transactions as 
purchases or sales by both executive and non-executive directors, but we allow  for a number 
of different definitions of the directors trading signal. A common definition is the net purchase 
ratio (e.g. Beneish and Vargus, 2002), and we employ this firm-specific measure of net insider 
trading, aggregating all directors’ trading activity within a period, as follows: 
NPR = [PURCHASES – SALES]/[PURCHASES+SALES]  (4) 
where PURCHASES is the value of shares purchased by directors and SALES is the 
value of shares sold in the period after the earnings announcement. A positive NPR could be 
the result of directors purchasing more shares or selling fewer shares and vice versa for a 
negative NPR. A positive NPR indicates net insider buying, whereas a negative NPR indicates 
net insider selling. NPR is estimated  using only open market purchases and sales of common 
shares in line with  Veenman (2012) .  A possible criticism of the NPR in equation (4) is that it 
does not take into account the relative importance of directors’ trades in terms of their personal 
wealth:  a trade which represents only a small percentage of the shares already owned by the 
director is likely to be less informative than a trade with a substantial impact on the directors’ 
wealth. We address this concern by estimating a “weighted-NPR”, where the weights applied 
are estimated as the ratio of the respective trade-size to the shares owned by the director. In the 
case of a single director trading, this will have no effect on the definition of a buy or sell signal. 
However, when many directors trade, the weighted-NPR depends on weights attached to the 
respective trades.   We also employ an alternative measure which identifies the direction of the 
insider trading signal based on the direction of the majority of directors’ trading.  We refer to 
this signal as “Net trades”, and in this case a buy signal would be defined when more directors 
are buying shares than directors selling shares, and vice versa for a sell signal. Finally, we 
acknowledge that in the presence of conflicting transactions (e.g., some directors sell and some 
buy), the insider trading signal may be ambiguous. In contrast, when all directors trade in the 
same direction, the trading signal is likely to be strong and clear. Our final definition of a 
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directors trading signal is based on “Consistent trades”, when multiple directors in a given 
company all trade in the same direction. 
We provide summary statistics on the sample of directors’ trades both before and after 
the earnings announcement in Table 2. Each panel reports the value of directors’ purchases and 
sales (which are fewer in number but larger in value), the daily net value of these trades across 
directors trading in the same firm, and the NPR calculated over the relevant period. We 
organise the presentation of this data across various windows of insider trading observation 
around the earnings announcement day (0): Panel A reports the insider trading statistics over 
the period of 72 days before the earnings announcement to 10 days after it (-72, +10); Panel B 
captures the period preceding the trading ban (-72, -42) and Panel C covers the trading ban 
period (-41, -1). In Panel D, we identify insider trading transactions that are disclosed within 
the first ten days after and including the earnings announcement, which also coincides with the 
end of the trading ban.  Additionally, Panel D presents summary statistics for the four 
alternative proxies of the insider trading signal employed here: (NPR, weighted-NPR, Net 
trades and Consistent trades) corresponding to the top and bottom quintiles formed on the basis 
of the earnings surprise. Note that both NPR and weighted-NPR are scaled to lie between (-1, 
+1). Figure 2 summarises the information in Table 2 and shows the number of daily insider 
trading transactions across all firms in our data set around the time of an earnings 
announcement (day 0), from 72 days before the earnings announcement to 10 days after. The 
figure confirms the effectiveness of the trading ban starting from approximately 42 (trading) 
days before the earnings announcement.  
TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Figure 2 indicates that the incidence of directors’ trading in the period after the earnings 
announcement is dramatically higher than in the period before the earnings announcement, and 
motivates our choice of a 10-day post-announcement period to compute our directors trading 
measures. The figure confirms insiders’ reluctance to trade before the announcement and 
preference to delay their trades as the former may expose them to litigation or reputation costs. 
In particular, the patterns of directors trading presented on Figure 2 demonstrate that they trade 
as early as the earnings announcement day and these trades are disclosed to the market in a 
timely fashion.  
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5.4 Discretionary accruals  
We estimate discretionary accruals in a two-stage procedure. In the first stage we use the 
Modified Jones (1991) model to predict the level of “non-discretionary” accruals as a function 
of the growth in revenues and gross property, plant and equipment. Specifically, we run a 
regression of total accruals for firm i, year t and sector j (two- digit ICB industry 
classification14) on the change in revenues and gross property, plant and equipment where all 
variables are scaled by the beginning total assets for each year. The second stage predicts the 
non-discretionary component of accruals using the estimated coefficients from the first stage. 
Note that in second stage, the influence of the cash sales is also taken into account by 
introducing the change in receivables, similarly to Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995).15 The 
“non-discretionary” part of the accruals then represents an estimate of the expected level of 
accruals and the remaining component is presumed to include managements’ discretion on 
accruals. Moreover, since performance might also be a determinant of  the level of accruals, 
the estimated discretionary accruals here are also “performance adjusted” in the manner 
advocated by Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005)  by adding return on assets (ROA) as an 
additional explanatory variable in the estimation of “non-discretionary” accruals.  Since firms 
do not announce their earnings on the same day or time of the year, the variables used to 
calculate discretionary accruals are not available for all firms in the same industry-year 
portfolio. Therefore, the entire distribution of discretionary accruals is typically unknown to 
the investors at the earnings announcement and, as a result, the hedge portfolio strategies that 
underlie our investigation cannot be implemented. Following Louis and Sun (2011), we address 
this issue by estimating the accrual model one year prior to the portfolio formation and then 
applying the estimated coefficients to the second stage of the estimation process and using the 
cut-off points from the year before (similar to the quintile ranks of the earnings surprise).  
6 Analysis 
6.1 Results 
Table 3 presents the initial univariate evidence on the post earnings announcement buy-and-
hold market adjusted abnormal returns over the six months period (+11, +125) after the 
                                                 
14 The two digit ICB provides 15 industry classifications where the equivalent SIC leads to 66 industry 
classifications, excluding missing and financial observations. We require at least 6 observations for each industry-
year sub-sample (similarly to García Lara et al., 2005). 
15 The change in receivables is included in order to control for managers’ attempts to manipulate earnings through 
discretionary revenues 
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earnings announcement. Panel A shows returns corresponding to the top and bottom quintiles 
of earnings surprises. The spread in returns between the top and bottom quintiles supports the 
presence of under-reaction to the earnings announcement. The average abnormal returns in the 
top quintile of earnings surprises are larger (+ 2.3%) than those in the bottom quintile (-1.1%), 
and this difference (+3.4%) is statistically significant, confirming the presence of the PEAD 
anomaly in the UK.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Panel B of Table 3 demonstrates the effect of conditioning these buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns on contrarian insider trading. In the presence of contrarian insider trading, the 
average buy and hold abnormal return over six months following the earnings announcement 
for the observations in the top quintile of the earnings surprise has a smaller magnitude than 
the corresponding figure for the observations in the bottom quintile. Moreover, the magnitude 
of the returns in both quintiles is low and not significantly different from zero. Confirming our 
first hypothesis H1, this finding suggests that in the presence of contrarian trades, the market 
interprets the earnings surprise as a transitory change in the earnings process and thus, does not 
capitalise its magnitude into share prices: there is no subsequent market reaction and the PEAD 
is mitigated. In contrast, the results in Panel C show that when there are confirmatory insider 
trades, the market infers that there has been a permanent change in the earnings process. Prices 
continue to move along the direction of the earnings surprise indicating that the market 
considers that the earnings surprise has information about a permanent change in the earnings 
process. The PEAD anomaly is particularly pronounced among this set of observations as the 
return spread between top and bottom earnings surprise quintiles is 7.3%. Further analysis 
indicates that this result is driven by the effect of insider purchases rather than sales. Being a 
costly and hence, credible signal of good prospects, confirmatory purchases represent  a strong 
signal that insiders regard the earnings surprise as reflecting a permanent change in the earnings 
process. Panel D reports the univariate results for earnings announcements with no subsequent 
directors’ trades. In this case the drift is similar to the pooled sample, but is smaller than in 
Panel C, highlighting the exacerbated response to confirmatory trades accelerates investor 
learning. Evidence of PEAD in the absence of directors’ trading implies that directors’ trading 
can only partly explain the PEAD. 
Table 4 reports the multivariate implementation of model (1) and provides evidence of 
an under-reaction to earning announcements after controlling for risk factors relevant to the 
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UK stock market. In addition, the regression employed here takes into account the panel 
structure of the data using firm- clustered standard errors and year fixed effects. Evidence on 
the PEAD anomaly is shown by the positive and significant coefficient of RUE; as explained 
in Section 4, the coefficient on RUE represents the spread in average abnormal returns between 
observations in the highest and lowest unexpected earnings surprise quintiles. The spread 
results reported in the first column of Table 4 provide significant evidence of PEAD (0.020; p-
value<0.05) even after controlling for size, momentum, book to market and other risk effects.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The results from testing hypotheses H1 and H2 are reported in the last four columns of 
Table 4. Consistent with our univariate tests, we find no significant evidence of under-reaction 
to the earnings surprise in the presence of contrarian insider trading. Specifically, the 
coefficient on Ctrar_RUE denoting the spread in average abnormal returns in the presence of 
contrarian trading, is -0.039 and statistically insignificant when we define insider transactions 
based on the net purchase ratio. We report similar results when we use the alternative 
definitions of the directors’ trading signal.  These findings support our hypothesis H1 with 
respect to the role of contrarian trading in mitigating the PEAD. In contrast, confirmatory 
insider trading conveys information to the market that there has been a permanent change in 
the earnings process. This is denoted by the magnitude and significance of the Cfirm_RUE 
coefficient across all alterative definitions of the insider trading signal. (e.g. 0.087; p-
value<0.01 when defining directors’ trading signal based on NPR).  In the absence of directors’ 
trading there is still significant evidence of the PEAD  as reflected by the value of the 
coefficient on NT_RUE across all definitions of directors’ trading signal (e.g. 0.019; p-
value<0.05 when defining directors’ trading signal based on NPR). Share prices continue to 
move along the direction of the surprise, but the drift is less pronounced than in the case of 
confirmatory directors’ trade. This would suggest that directors’ trades cannot completely 
explain all of the PEAD, but there may well be other sources of information available to 
investors’ post-earnings announcement enabling them to infer the permanent-transitory nature 
of the earnings surprise. 
To further support our evidence with respect to the information conveyed by contrarian 
and confirmatory insider trading about the permanent-transitory nature of earnings surprise we 
test whether the coefficients are statistically significantly different from one another using 
Wald tests. Collectively, the results indicate that the coefficient of Cfirm_RUE is significantly 
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higher than the coefficient of NT_RUE which in turn, is larger than the coefficient of 
Ctrar_RUE. This hierarchy highlights the distinctive effect of insider trading upon the PEAD 
and is in line with our predictions as illustrated in Figure 1. Overall, these findings confirm the 
important role for directors’ contrarian trading in alleviating the PEAD anomaly while 
confirmatory insider trading explains, in part, the PEAD. 
The proposition advanced in the development of hypotheses H1 and H2 is that the 
disclosure of informed insider trading provides relevant information to the market that 
accelerates investors’ learning on the transitory-permanent nature of the earnings surprise. In 
Table 5, we provide further support to our hypotheses by examining the influence of earnings 
precision on the speed at which investors incorporate the news about the earnings surprise.  
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Francis et al. (2007) argue that low earnings precision delays investors’ learning and 
hence, aggravates the under-reaction to earnings announcements. In line with this argument, 
we find that the PEAD is more pronounced and significant under circumstances of low earnings 
precision. In the first column of Table 5, we report that the coefficient of RUEit is positive and 
significant (0.031; p-value <0.01), but the PEAD dissipates as earnings precision increases 
(denoted by the interaction between PREC and RUE: -0.035; p-value<0.10).  
The remaining four columns in Table 5 present the results of testing the two parts of 
Hypothesis H3 for the four alternative proxies of insider trading signals. In H3 we predict that 
the insider trading signal initiates a learning process which is distinctive from the learning 
process underlying the earnings precision. That is, we expect that contrarian directors’ trading 
has a distinct ability to unravel the earnings process even under circumstances where we expect 
that the PEAD should occur (H3a). The tests reported in Table 5 confirm this hypothesis by 
means of the small magnitude and insignificant coefficient of Ctrar_RUE, when the earnings 
precision is low. This result is in contrast to the coefficients of Cfirm_RUE and NT_RUE both 
of which are significant and large in magnitude. A comparison of the coefficients reported in 
the “Low earnings precision” panel supports this inference. 
Analogous to H3a, hypothesis H3b predicts that confirmatory trades will initiate an 
exacerbated PEAD even under circumstances where the PEAD is not expected to occur. The 
results reported on Table 5 support this prediction. First, we find that the coefficient of 
Cfirm_RUE is large and significant. The coefficient of Cfirm_RUE captures the PEAD 
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anomaly for those firms with low earnings precision (PREC=0) in the presence of confirmatory 
insider trading, and its estimated value is 0.065 with a p-value <0.10, in the case of the NPR 
signal. More importantly, the coefficient of the interaction between Cfirm_RUE and PREC is 
positive and insignificant denoting a persistent PEAD, even under circumstances of high 
earnings precision. Again, the results from a comparison of the coefficients reported in the 
“High earnings precision” panel re-affirm this inference: under high earnings precision, the 
PEAD is present only when directors trade in a confirmatory direction. 
  
Finally, when directors are not trading, we find that the earnings precision effect 
dominates, with the absence of insider trading in low precision firms, denoted by NT_RUE, 
producing a coefficient that is positive and significant (0.036; p-value <0.05). High precision 
earnings mitigate the uncertainty as reflected by the significant negative coefficient of the 
interaction between NT_RUE and PREC. The contrast between the results in the absence of 
insider trading and the results discussed earlier serves to attest to the distinctive effect of insider 
trading on the PEAD. 
 
6.2 Sensitivity tests  
We conduct a series of sensitivity checks to confirm whether our findings are robust to 
alternative definitions of the key variables. These results are available in an On-line Appendix 
3, but we summarise the main findings here. It might be argued that the apparent PEAD 
anomaly, identified in Table 3 and in the first column of Table 4, may be spurious if it is not 
economically important, even though it is statistically significant, since it might not be possible 
to design a trading strategy that implements the apparent anomaly. 16  We have therefore re-
estimated the initial multivariate PEAD regressions (first column Table 4) on the significance 
of the spread between top and bottom quintile portfolios (formed from earnings surprises) using 
implementable returns following Soares and Stark (2009). We use a “June-strategy” and rank 
firms each year according to their unexpected earnings at the end of June. Subsequently, we 
measure returns from the beginning of July and for six months using daily returns as in our 
                                                 
16 As we discuss in the research design we determine the cut-off points of the quintile ranks of the earnings 
surprise and earnings precision by the distribution of the earnings surprise and discretionary accruals in the 
previous year in order to ensure that the portfolio strategies are implementable similar to Louis and Sun (2011). 
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original tests. The spread on the RUE coefficient remains positive and significant, so the 
original PEAD is robust to implementable returns; and there is an anomaly to be explained.  
In a second robustness test we assess the PEAD over alternative time horizons (2, 3, 4, 
and 5-months), and we find that the unconditional spread is always significantly positive, with 
values of 1.3% for the 2-month, 0.9% at the 3-month and 4-month horizons, 2.0% at the 5-
month horizon, and increases to 3.4% (as reported in Table 3) at the 6-month horizon. In the 
presence of contrarian trades, at all horizons this spread is not significantly different from zero. 
In contrast, conditioned on confirmatory trades, the spread is significantly positive, and the 
median spread increases with the time horizon. The multivariate regression results for 2-month, 
3-month 4-month and 5-month post-earnings announcement time horizons confirm that 
conditioning on contrarian trades, the PEAD spread evaporates, but is exacerbated in the 
presence of confirmatory trades. To further confirm that the effect of insider trading on the 
PEAD is distinct from the initial short term reaction to its disclosure (Veenman, 2012), we 
delay the starting date of return accumulation. Rather than starting on day (+11), we start the 
accumulation on day (+21) and we observe the PEAD over the subsequent 5-months period. 
The unconditional spread is now even wider (+2.4%) and our inference with respect to the 
effect of insider trading remains unchanged.  
Third, we check the sensitivity of our results to the period over which we observe the 
insiders’ signal. Instead of calculating the directors’ trading signals over the 10-day period after 
the earnings announcement, in a third set of tests we calculate the four alternative signals over 
the period (0, +5) and (0, +17), starting the return accumulation over six months from day +6 
and +18 respectively. We find that the unconditional PEAD spread, and the PEAD spread 
conditioned on confirmatory and contrarian trades are of the same order of magnitude as the 
reported results in Tables 3 and 4, although with the short (0, +5) directors’ trading period, we 
lose some significance because the numbers of observations with directors’ trading is smaller.  
Fourth, we exclude 370 observations from 75 companies that report quarterly interim 
reports after the annual earnings announcements. Fifth, we exclude 439 firms that were listed 
on AIM, rather than the Main Market on the basis that trading in these firms is likely to be 
relatively illiquid. Finally, we partition our earning precision measures in terms of quintiles 
instead of terciles. In all cases the results are consistent with the main findings with respect to 
the effect of contrarian and confirmatory directors trading on the PEAD. 
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7 Conclusions  
In this paper we have argued that the PEAD is a consequence of investors learning and updating 
their beliefs as to whether a structural change has occurred in the earnings process. When 
companies announce unexpectedly high or low earnings, investors must establish the 
implications of the earnings surprise for future earnings: does the earnings announcement 
represent a transitory change in profitability or a permanent change in earnings to a new 
average level? Directors trading immediately after the earnings announcement provide 
additional information on the transitory or permanent nature of the earnings surprise. Given 
directors’ access to inside information we would expect them to be in an advantageous position 
to assess the valuation implications of an earnings surprise. If directors sell after good news, or 
buy after bad news – in other words trade in a contrarian direction to the earnings surprise - 
this suggests that the director believes that the earnings surprise reflects only a transitory 
change in the earnings process and therefore, it will not support a further change in the share 
price along the direction of the earnings surprise. We also examined directors buying after good 
news and selling after bad news, and such confirmatory trades suggest directors consider the 
earnings surprise to represent a permanent change in earnings. Nevertheless, we note that in 
the case of confirmatory trades, investors may have difficulty in assessing the new permanent 
levels of equilibrium share prices resulting in a stronger drift. 
We find that conditioning stock price movements after an earnings announcement on 
contrarian and confirmatory directors’ trades sheds light on the well-documented anomaly, the 
market under-reaction to earnings announcements, or PEAD. Recognising that the under-
reaction represents a delayed response to the earnings surprise, we demonstrate that contrarian 
directors’ trades mitigate the PEAD, and confirmatory trades allow for a continuation of the 
PEAD as prices to continue to move in the direction of the earnings surprise. Further analysis 
demonstrates that contrarian trades guide the market to establish that the earnings surprise does 
not consist a permanent shift in the earnings process even in hard-to-value firms with low 
earnings precision. On the contrary, confirmatory trades initiate a learning process to establish 
the shift in the earning process even under circumstances where this is not likely to occur, i.e., 
under high earnings precision. Taken together these results speak to the particular effect of 
insider trading on the long-term price discovery. 
A caveat to these findings is that insider trading can only in part explain the PEAD. 
Although our study contributes to the understanding of the PEAD anomaly from a learning 
27 
 
mechanism perspective, further research could identify other sources of information that 
investors use to update their beliefs on structural changes to the earnings process.  
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Figure 1: Predicted effects on stock prices of directors’ trading after an earnings 
announcement 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows predicted stock market responses after the earnings announcement and post-earnings 
announcement directors’ trades, and the effect of conditioning on confirmatory and contrary directors’ trades 
(DT).  
Figure 2: Number of directors’ trades per day around earnings announcements 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the total number of daily directors’ trades up to 72 days before an earnings announcement 
and 10 days after. The trading ban is in place from day -42 to day 0. The blue line denotes days when the directors’ 
trades occur, and the brown line denotes days when the directors’ trades are reported to the market. 
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Table 1: Sample Selection process 
19,804 Initial sample of firm-year observations 
The initial sample consists of all publicly listed companies in the UK 
between 1995 and 2013 with available accounting data.  In identifying the 
firms that have been listed in the UK, we use Datastream’s research lists of 
active (GRP1-6) and dead companies (DEADUK1-7). From these lists we 
eliminate duplicates, instruments which are not classified as equity, non-
primary issues and financial firms (based on ICB industry classification).  
(11,824) Total firm-year observations excluded, of which: 
(9,366) Missing earnings announcements. We require the earnings announcements 
to be available in Datastream or I\B\E\S. We use the earliest earnings 
announcement reported in Datastream or I\B\E\S after eliminating earnings 
announcements announced 200 days after the fiscal year end.  
(73) Missing data needed to estimate unexpected earnings 
(2,044) Missing returns data needed to estimate returns 
(7) Missing accounting data needed to estimate earnings precision 
(334) Outliers removed 
7,980 Final sample: [firms =1,373] 
 
 
  
30 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Directors’ Trading 
 
Number 
of 
trades 
Mean Min (000s) Q1 Median Q3 Max (000s)  
Panel A: Full Sample period (-72,+10)       
Value shares bought (£) 12,772 44,708 0.001 126 2,750 16,880 69,200 
Value shares sold (£) 2,718 743,654 0.031 25,253 117,699 491,643 130,000 
Net value traded (£ firm-days) 6,850 -211,712 -130,0000 130 3,955 25,475 54,800 
NPR (firm level)  3,501 0.44 -1.00 -0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel B: Pre-ban period (-72,-42)       
Value shares bought (£) 4,763 63,316 0.001 126 2,998 15,795 69,200 
Value shares sold (£) 736 163,644 0.003 3,860 20,000 109,491 6,500 
Net value traded (£ firm-days) 2,671 -60,737 -34,000 248 5,250 24,350 54,800 
NPR (firm level) 1,839 0.61 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel C: Ban period (-41,-1)       
Value shares bought (£) 3,297 13,502 0.002 123 127 1,015 14,000 
Value shares sold (£) 172 382,980 0.031 14,775 63,157 478,258 6,150,000 
Net value traded (£ firm-days) 1,228 -17,388 -6,560 244 476 3,323 14,000 
NPR (firm level)  711 0.78 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel D: Post-EA period (0, +10)       
Value shares bought (£) 4,712 47,734 0.003 1,740 10,000 30,700 20,100 
Value shares sold (£) 1,810 824,074 0.10 31,338 137,587 502,400 130,000 
Net value traded (£ firm-days) 2,963 -427,489 -130,000 -10,889 9,026 40,026 22,200 
NPR (firm level): All 2,228 0.39 -1.00 -0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NPR: UE1 Quintile 415 0.60 -1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
NPR: UE5 Quintile 422 0.42 -1.00 -0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weighted NPR: UE1 Quintile 415 0.60 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Weighted NPR: UE5 Quintile 422 0.42 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Net trades: UE1 Quintile 240 2.66 -8.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 17.00 
Net trades: UE5 Quintile 245 1.93 -14.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 14.00 
Consistent trades: UE1 
Quintile 
204 2.85 -6.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 15.00 
Consistent trades: UE5 
Quintile 
204 2.14 -6.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 10.00 
Notes: The table provides descriptive statistics on the sample of directors’ trades (by executive and non-executive board 
members) in their own company shares across 1,373 firms over the period 1995-2013 in the 92-day period (-72,+10) 
around the annual earnings announcement. Panel A documents directors’ trading statistics for the full sample period; 
Panel B for the period (-72, -42) before the trading ban; Panel C for the period (-41, -1) during the trading ban; Panel D 
for the period (0, +10) after the earnings announcement which is made at the start of day 0. The first and second rows of 
each panel shows the distribution of the value of shares purchased and sold; the third row shows the distribution of the 
net daily shares traded across directors in the same firm (positive for buys, and negative for sales) by value of shares 
traded; and the fourth row shows the distribution of the NPR calculated at the firm level for the relevant sample period 
by value of transactions. NPR is defined as the net value of shares traded scaled by the value of shares traded, and hence 
lies between (-1, +1). The fifth and sixth rows of Panel D show the distribution of NPR for the bottom and top quintile 
portfolios formed by earnings surprise. The seventh and eighth rows of Panel D show the distribution of Weighted NPR 
for the UE5 and UE1 quintile portfolios, where weighted NPR accommodates the effect of directors’ shareholding wealth. 
The ninth and tenth rows of Panel D show the distribution of Net trades for bottom and top quintile portfolios, where Net 
trades is defined as the (unscaled) difference between the number of buy and sell signals. The last two rows of Panel D 
show the distribution of Consistent trades for bottom and top quintile portfolios, defined as the (unscaled) number of trade 
signals by multiple directors in the same direction.    
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Table 3: Spread returns 
Panel A:  Spread returns for the pooled sample 
 UE 1 UE 5 UE 5 - UE 1 
N 1591 1679  
  Mean -0.011* 0.023*** 0.034*** 
  Median -0.001 0.019*** 0.021*** 
Panel B: Spread returns in the presence of contrarian insider trading 
 UE 1 UE 5 UE 5 - UE 1 
N 329 122  
  Mean 0.011 -0.004 -0.014 
  Median 0.033 -0.028 -0.061 
Panel C: Spread returns in the presence of confirmatory insider trading 
 UE 1 UE 5 UE 5 - UE 1 
N 82 299  
  Mean -0.030 0.043*** 0.073** 
  Median -0.023 0.048*** 0.071*** 
Panel D: Spread returns in the absence of insider trading 
 UE 1 UE 5 UE 5 - UE 1 
N 1180 1258  
  Mean -0.016** 0.020*** 0.036*** 
  Median -0.004 0.010** 0.013** 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Notes: Table reports univariate six-month buy-and-hold portfolio returns after earnings announcement for 
quintiles of high earnings surprises (UE 5) and low earnings surprises (UE 1), and spread portfolio between 
these two portfolios (UE 5 – UE 1). Panel A reports buy-and-hold returns (BHARs) for the full sample. Panel 
B reports BHARs for sample of contrarian insider trades, and Panel C reports BHARs for sample of 
confirmatory insider trades. Panel D reports BHARs for a sample of firm announcements after which there 
are no directors’ trades. In all cases the directors’ trading signal is based on the net purchases ratio, NPR. 
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Table 4: PEAD and the presence of contrarian and confirmatory insider trading with 
alternative insider trading signals. 
 
VARIABLES Base model NPR 
Weighted 
NPR 
Net trades 
Consistent 
trades 
Constant -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.131*** 
  (-8.04) (-8.14) (-8.14) (-7.99) (-8.00) 
RUE 0.020**     
 (2.03)     
Ctrar_RUE  -0.039 -0.038 -0.028 -0.014 
  (-1.48) (-1.43) (-0.70) (-0.30) 
Cfirm_RUE  0.087*** 0.086*** 0.109** 0.108** 
  (2.82) (2.78) (2.57) (2.11) 
NT_RUE  0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 0.019* 
  (1.68) (1.70) (1.68) (1.68) 
Ctrar  -0.009 -0.007 0.015 0.026 
  (-0.62) (-0.51) (0.72) (1.11) 
Cfirm  -0.005 -0.006 -0.021 -0.021 
  (-0.32) (-0.35) (-0.99) (-0.81) 
Q5MM 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 
  (8.70) (8.84) (8.83) (8.53) (8.35) 
Q5BM 0.024** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023** 0.025** 
  (2.11) (2.03) (2.04) (1.98) (2.09) 
Q5MV 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 
 (4.23) (4.23) (4.23) (4.14) (4.15) 
Q5LEV 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
 (3.09) (2.99) (2.99) (3.14) (3.15) 
Q5RD -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 
 (-1.19) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.19) (-1.24) 
Q5SP -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.064*** 
 (-5.34) (-5.25) (-5.25) (-5.17) (-5.12) 
Q5CFO 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (8.38) (8.41) (8.41) (8.49) (8.51) 
Q5CC -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 
 (-0.64) (-0.63) (-0.63) (-0.64) (-0.67) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,980 7,980 7,980 7,628 7,550 
Adj R-squared 0.0726 0.0734 0.0733 0.0724 0.0710 
F test 21.08 19.49 19.47 18.94 18.53 
Wald tests testing the equality of coefficients  
  Diff Diff Diff Diff 
Cfirm_RUE -Ctrar_RUE  
0.127*** 0.124*** 0.138** 0.121* 
(3.16) (3.09) (2.43) (1.84) 
Cfirm_RUE- NT_RUE 
0.068** 0.067** 0.090** 0.088* 
(2.07) (2.02) (2.05) (1.70) 
NT_RUE-Ctrar_RUE  
0.058** 0.057** 0.047 0.033 
(2.01) (1.97) (1.12) (0.69) 
 Notes: The first column of the table reports the results from estimating equation (1) and the remaining four 
columns report the results from estimating (2) under alternative definitions of the directors’ trading signal: the 
second column presents the results when directors trading signal is based on the net purchase ratio (NPR); the 
third column when directors trading signal based on the weighted net purchase ratio, where weights depend on 
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directors’ shareholding wealth (weighted NPR); the fourth column when directors trading signal defined by 
majority of the directors are trading in the same direction (Net trades); and last column when directors trading 
signal depends on multiple directors all trading in the same direction (Consistent trades). UE is quintile rank of 
earnings surprise where unexpected earnings is  calculated as the difference between the I/B/E/S actual reported 
earnings and the single most recent forecast deflated by the stock price; RUE stands for rescaled unexpected 
earnings quintiles, and equals -0.5 if the firms belongs to the lowest quintile of UE, 0.5 if a firm belongs to top 
quintile of UE and zero otherwise;  Ctrar_RUE equals to RUE in the presence of informed insider trading, and 
zero otherwise; Cfirm_RUE  equals to RUE in the presence of non-informed insider trading, and zero otherwise; 
NT_RUE equals to RUE when directors abstain from trading. Risk controls included: Q5MM, quintile rank of 
momentum measured as the buy-and-hold market adjusted returns over the 6 months up to the earnings 
announcement; QBM, quintile rank of the book to market ratio; QMV, quintile rank of the market value of the 
company measured at the fiscal year end for each company; Q5LEV, quintile rank of leverage; Q5RD, quintile 
rank of the ratio of research and development to market value; Q5SP, quintile rank of the natural logarithm of the 
share price measured at start of the return accumulation period; Q5CFO, quintile rank of operating cash flows 
divided by total assets, and Q5CC, quintile rank of capital expenditures divided by market value. Dependent 
variable is buy-and-hold abnormal return in excess of market return. Terms in brackets are t-statistics, computed 
from standard errors clustered at the firm level, and where *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
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Table 5: PEAD and the presence of contrarian and confirmatory insider trading: The impact of earnings 
signal precision. 
VARIABLES Base model NPR Weighted NPR Net trades 
Consistent 
trades 
Constant -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.131*** -0.130*** -0.131*** 
  (-8.00) (-8.09) (-8.09) (-7.93) (-7.96) 
RUE 0.031***     
 (2.59)     
RUE*PREC -0.035*     
 (-1.82)     
Ctrar_RUE  -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.004 
  (-0.92) (-0.93) (-0.62) (-0.07) 
Ctrar_RUE*PREC  -0.030 -0.024 0.005 -0.027 
  (-0.59) (-0.48) (0.07) (-0.39) 
Cfirm_RUE  0.065* 0.066* 0.094* 0.071 
  (1.70) (1.72) (1.77) (1.11) 
Cfirm_RUE*PREC  0.064 0.059 0.039 0.087 
  (1.25) (1.15) (0.60) (1.24) 
NT_RUE  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 
  (2.58) (2.60) (2.59) (2.60) 
NT_RUE*PREC  -0.054** -0.054** -0.055** -0.055** 
  (-2.28) (-2.30) (-2.31) (-2.31) 
PREC -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.08) (-0.29) (-0.27) (-0.22) (-0.10) 
Ctrar  -0.009 -0.007 0.015 0.026 
  (-0.64) (-0.53) (0.73) (1.11) 
Cfirm  -0.005 -0.006 -0.020 -0.019 
  (-0.32) (-0.36) (-0.96) (-0.72) 
Risk controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 7,980 7,980 7,980 7,628 7,550 
Adj R-squared 0.0728 0.0738 0.0737 0.0727 0.0714 
F test 19.76 17.53 17.49 16.93 16.60 
Wald tests testing the equality of coefficients  
  Diff Diff Diff Diff 
Low earnings precision      
Cfirm_RUE -Ctrar_RUE   
 0.095* 0.096* 0.123* 0.075 
 (1.85) (1.87) (1.73) (0.88) 
Cfirm_RUE- NT_RUE 
 0.030 0.030 0.057 0.035 
 (0.73) (0.74) (1.07) (0.54) 
NT_RUE- Ctrar_RUE   
 0.066* 0.066* 0.066 0.040 
 (1.83) (1.85) (1.30) (0.70) 
High earnings precision      
Cfirm_RUE -Ctrar_RUE   
 0.189*** 0.180*** 0.158** 0.189** 
 (3.32) (3.13) (2.12) (2.36) 
Cfirm_RUE- NT_RUE 
 0.148*** 0.143*** 0.151*** 0.176*** 
 (3.23) (3.10) (2.65) (2.86) 
NT_RUE- Ctrar_RUE   
 0.041 0.036 0.006 0.013 
 (0.91) (0.80) (0.11) (0.20) 
Notes The first column of the table reports the results from estimating equation (3) before taking into account directors’ trades; the 
remaining four columns report the results from estimating (3) including directors’ trading variables.  PREC takes value of 1 if a firm 
belongs to the bottom tercile of the magnitude of discretionary accruals, and 0 otherwise. The remaining variables and risk controls 
are explained in the footnote to Table 4. Terms in brackets are t-statistics, computed from standard errors clustered at the firm level, 
and where *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Appendix 1: Illustration of learning and a delayed response to earnings information 
We consider a simple example to illustrate how investors updating their beliefs about a shock 
to the earnings process, can explain the documented PEAD. The purpose of this example is to 
show that with a structural change and parameter uncertainty there will be a delayed response 
to an earnings announcement, as Bayesian investors update on other relevant pieces of 
information associated with the structural change. There will be a pattern in stock prices 
following the structural change. 
Suppose earnings (et) are generated by a uniform distribution U(.), with support (0, W0). The 
present value model, with an earnings announcement imminent, would price this earnings 
stream as pt-1 =0.5W0(1 + δ), where δ is the appropriate discount factor. Realised earnings are 
then announced, and prices jump to pt=et+0.5δW0. At some point after the announcement the 
price will go ex-dividend, and the stock price will revert to its long-run expected value 
(=0.5δW0).  
Suppose the announced realised earnings are above the upper support of the original uniform 
distribution: et > W0. This event represents a structural change: the earnings process is still 
generated by a uniform distribution U(0, W), but the distribution of the earnings process has 
changed, with parameter uncertainty about the new upper limit W. We assume that investors 
update their beliefs about the unknown parameter W according to Bayesian rules. Following 
De Groot (1970) Section 9.7 Theorem 1, a conjugate prior for the likelihood function being a 
uniform distribution is the Pareto distribution with parameters (w0, α), meaning that the 
posterior distribution for W after observing a single piece of sample information x1 from the 
uniform distribution, is also Pareto with parameters (w0’, α’) where w0’ = max (w0, x1) and α’ 
= α+1. In the Pareto distribution w0 is the minimum possible value of W and α is a positive 
parameter that reflects the shape of the distribution, and reflects the range of possible values 
of W above the scale parameter w0. Over time, as more sample information is accumulated, 
the scale parameter is updated in the posterior distribution to mimic any higher realised values, 
and over time the shape parameter in the posterior distribution gets larger and the range of 
upside values above the scale parameter is reduced. 
Figure 1 illustrates the initial uniform distribution U(0, W0), and the post-structural change 
uniform distribution U(0, W), with the prior beliefs represented by a Pareto distribution of the 
unknown parameter W. The mean and variance of the Pareto distribution is given by 
𝐸(𝑊) =
𝛼𝑤0
𝛼 − 1
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊) =
𝛼𝑤0
2
(𝛼 − 1)2(𝛼 − 2)
 
Which represent the prior beliefs about W. Given the sample information x1, posterior mean 
and variance is: 
𝐸(𝑊|𝑥1) =
(𝛼 + 1)𝑤0′
𝛼
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑊|𝑥1) =
(𝛼 + 1)𝑤0
′2
𝛼2(𝛼 − 1)
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A reasonable candidate for the prior value of w0 is the realised earnings announcement et, and 
so α represents the strength in the beliefs that et is the upper support of the new distribution, 
or whether the upper support is even higher.  
Prices at date t (the earnings announcement): Following the unexpected earnings et > W0, 
prices will jump to 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑤0 (1 + 0.5𝛿
𝛼
𝛼−1
) which is based on the prior for the Pareto 
distribution, and is unambiguously higher than in the case of no structural change. Subsequent 
movements in prices after the earnings announcement depends on any additional sample 
information provided by whether there is trading by informed insiders or not. The piece of 
sample information that investors observe is whether a director trades on the day after the 
earnings announcement, or does not trade. Directors know the true value of W, and hence know 
the true fundamental price pt
f = (w0 +0.5δW), which differs from the market price depending 
on whether W  ≥  
𝛼𝑤0
𝛼−1
 investors believe that directors will buy shares if the stock price is pt < 
pt
f, and not trade if pt = pt
f.  
So if directors buy shares, investors infer that W>w0 (since 
𝛼
𝛼−1
> 1), which constitutes the 
piece of sample information, and w0’ = max (w0, I: x1> w0) and α’ = α+1. A simple price 
adjustment rule is that if investors observe x1>w0 they set w0’=w0+1.17  
Prices at date t+1: In which case prices become: 𝑝𝑡+1| (𝐼: 𝑥1 > 𝑤0) = 𝑤0 + 0.5𝛿
(𝛼+1)(𝑤0+1)
𝛼
 
> pt if α>√(w0+1). So that following the directors’ trade, prices may rise or fall depending on 
parameter values. For example, prices would rise if α=w0=2, or α=4, w0=8. In these cases, 
prices will rise after the market observes directors’ confirmatory trading, and there will be 
PEAD. 
On the other hand if directors do not trade on the day after the earnings announcement, 
investors infer that W<w0, and w0’ = max (w0, I: x1<w0), α’ = α+1, and prices unambiguously 
decline: 𝑝𝑡+1| (𝐼: 𝑥1 < 𝑤0) = 𝑤0 (1 + 0.5𝛿
(𝛼+1)
𝛼
).   
For some parameter values prices will fall in both cases, irrespective of the sample information 
because the learning effect induces an increase in the posterior precision of the unknown 
parameter W, (Veronesi, 1999). The price fall is always greater in the case of directors not 
trading. That is, the price following a directors’ trade is always higher than the price with no 
directors’ trade: 𝑝𝑡+1|( 𝐼: 𝑥1 > 𝑤0) > 𝑝𝑡+1|(𝐼: 𝑥1 < 𝑤0). 
Prices at date t+2: Now we progress into the second day after the earnings announcement, and 
investors will again observe whether directors trade or not. Investors have new priors given by 
the posterior Pareto distribution from the previous time period with parameters (w0’, α’). 
Investors will again update their beliefs from the trading behaviour of directors in period t+2 
(x2). If there are no trades from directors, prices fall again to: 𝑝𝑡+2| (𝐼: 𝑥2 < 𝑤0) =
𝑤0 (1 + 0.5𝛿
(𝛼+2)
(𝛼+1)
);  but if directors trade, investors again infer that the fundamental price is 
                                                 
17 There may be faster updating rules for prices depending upon the model that investors believe directors are 
following to trade strategically. 
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above the current market price, and will update their beliefs accordingly, and prices become: 
𝑝𝑡+2|(𝐼: 𝑥2 > 𝑤0) = 𝑤0′ + 0.5𝛿
(𝛼+2)(𝑤0+2)
(𝛼+1)
, with a sufficient condition for being greater than 
pt+1 is the same conditions as previously, so that we observe a PEAD. This process will 
continue until market prices converge to fundamental prices, which is when directors cease 
trading. 
This example illustrates how learning about a structural change in the context of a shock to 
earnings and subsequent directors’ trading leads to a pattern of stock prices that with the 
benefit of hindsight may look predictable, but as Lewellen and Shanken (2002) observe, no 
Bayesian investor would be able to take advantage of this apparent predictable pattern in 
prices. 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure A1: Initial and post-structural change uniform distributions for earnings process, along with 
prior Pareto distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram illustrates the shift in the uniform distribution, and the Pareto prior for the unknown W. 
Note that the subsequent posterior distributions (which depend on the sample realisations) are not 
represented in this figure. 
W0 w0 (=et) 
Prior Pareto distribution 
P(w0, α): high α 
Pareto 
distribution: low α 
Initial uniform distribution: 
U(0, W0) 
Post-structural change uniform distribution: 
U(0, W), with unknown W 
𝑒 =0.5W0  
→ 𝑝 = 𝑒𝑡 + 0.5𝛿𝑊0 → 𝑝 = 𝑤0 (1 + 0.5𝛿
𝛼
𝛼 − 1
) 
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Appendix 2: Variable definitions 
VARIABLE DEFINITION SOURCE 
BHARa Buy-and-hold market adjusted abnormal return measured from +11 
to +136 days relative to the earnings announcement calculated from 
trade to trade daily returns. For a stock not traded on a given day, the 
corresponding market return is added to the next non-missing price 
day’s index return.  
Datastream: Price (P), 
Dividend (DDE),  
Market return (FTALLSH) 
UE Quintile rank of unexpected earnings. Unexpected earnings are 
defined as the difference between actual EPS and forecasted EPS 
scaled by lag price. Quintilecut-off points of the earnings surprise are 
based on the distribution of the preceding year’s surprises. 
IBES: forecasted EPS 
IBES: actual EPS 
Datastream: Prices (P) 
RUE Rescaled quintile rank of unexpected earnings, which takes the value 
“-0.5” when an observation belongs to the bottom quintile rank of 
earnings surprise and “0.5” when an observation belongs to the top 
quintile rank of earnings surprise. RUE is equal to zero for the 
intermediate quintiles. 
IBES: forecasted EPS 
IBES: actual EPS 
Datastream: Prices (P) 
Q5MM Quintile rank of momentum measured as the buy and hold market 
adjusted returns over the 6 months up to the earnings announcement. 
Datastream: Price (P), 
Dividend (DDE),  
Market return (FTALLSH) 
Q5BM Quintile rank of firm book-to-market. Worldscope: Common equity: 
(WC03501),  
Market Capitalisation 
(WC08001) 
Q5MV Quintile rank of firm size measured as the market value of the 
company measured at the fiscal year end.  
Worldscope: Market 
Capitalisation (WC08001) 
Q5LEV Quintile rank of leverage measured as total debt divided by the 
market value of the company measured at the fiscal year end. 
Worldscope: Total Debt: 
(WC03255), 
Market Capitalisation 
(WC08001) 
Q5RD Quintile rank of the ratio of research and development expenses to 
the market value of the company measured at the fiscal year end. 
Worldscope: R&D expense: 
(WC01201),  
Market Capitalisation: 
(WC08001) 
Q5SP Quintile rank of the natural logarithm of the share price measured at 
the start of the return accumulation period 
Datastream: Price (P), 
Q5CFO Quintile rank of operating cash flows divided by total assets.  Worldscoppe: Total Funds 
From Operations (WC04201),  
Other Funds From Operations 
(WC04831),  
Total assets (WC02999) 
Q5CC Quintile rank of capital expenditures divided by the market value Worldscope: Capital 
Expenditure (WC04601), 
Market Capitalisation ( 
WC08001) 
Ctrar Dummy variable which equals 1 if the directors’ trading signal 
indicates trading in the opposite direction to the earnings surprise and 
zero otherwise  
Hemscott: Directors trades: 
Cfirm Dummy variable which equals 1 if the directors’ trading signal 
indicates trading in the same direction of the earnings surprise and 
zero otherwise. 
Hemscott: Directors trades: 
Ctrar_RUE Equals to RUE when directors’ trading signal indicates trading in the 
opposite direction of the earnings surprise (when Ctrar equals to 1) 
and zero otherwise. 
IBES: forecasted EPS 
IBES: actual EPS 
Datastream: Prices (P) 
Cfirm_RUE Equals to RUE when directors’ trading signal indicates trading in the 
same direction of the earnings surprise (when Cfirm equals to 1) and 
zero otherwise. 
IBES: forecasted EPS 
IBES: actual EPS 
Datastream: Prices (P) 
NT_RUE Equals to RUE when the directors’ trading signal indicates no 
directors’ trading, and zero otherwise. 
IBES: forecasted EPS 
IBES: actual EPS 
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Datastream: Prices (P) 
PREC Earnings precision variable equals to 1 if a firm’s earnings are 
precise and zero otherwise. We define earnings precision based on 
the magnitude of total discretionary accruals. Firms belonging in the 
bottom tercile rank of the magnitude of total discretionary accruals 
have low levels of discretionary accruals and are deemed to report 
more precise earnings. The cut-off points of the tercile ranks are 
determined by the distribution of the magnitude of discretionary 
accruals at the year before. Discretionary accruals are estimated 
based on the modified Jones (1991) model adjusted for performance.  
Worldscope: Income Before 
Extra Items: WC04001 
Total Funds From Operations 
(WC04201), 
Other Funds From Operations 
(WC04831),  
Sales (WC01001),  
Total assets (WC02999),  
Receivables (WC02051),  
Gross Property, Plant and 
Equipment (WC02301) 
   
a variable trimmed at 2% at the top and bottom of its distribution 
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